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NOTES
FREE ENTERPRISE - PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER
THE CLAYTON ACT

Respondent, a brewer with nation-wide sales, lowered the
wholesale price of its beer in St. Louis, but not in other areas.
This removed the price differential that had existed in St. Louis
between respondent's wholesale price and the wholesale prices
of other brewers in the area. As a consequence, respondent substantially increased its share of the market. An action brought
by the Federal Trade Commission resulted in the issuance of a
cease-and-desist order based on a finding that respondent's
lowering of prices in only one geographical area was a price
discrimination within the meaning of Section 2 of the Clayton
Act as amended, and that the evidence indicated that such price
discrimination tended to destroy competition between respondent
and competing brewers in that area. The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the Commission on the ground that the
price cuts in the area were not discriminatory under the Clayton
Act.' Since the reductions in price were granted uniformly to
all the area purchasers, none of the competing purchasers thereby secured an advantage. On certiorari granted to resolve a conflict in the circuit courts of appeal as to the proper interpretation of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended, the United
States Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded to consider
evidence in defense of the discrimination. A uniform price reduction by a national seller in one particular geographical area
is a price discrimination within the meaning of Section 2(a)
of the Clayton Act - a price discrimination being merely a price
difference. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
The original Clayton Act of 19142 was construed to forbid
of Mr. Justice Harlan is not utilized, then on a retrial the issue to be presented
to the jury will be whether or not the rail with slime on it was reasonably suitable
for the use intended. See Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 81 Sup. Ct. 6
(1960).
1. Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959). The decision was based
on the theory that a difference in price was not a discrimination in price unless
a competitive relationship existed between the parties paying the different prices
so that the parties paying the lower price received an advantage. Since all the
purchasers in the St. Louis area paid the same price regardless of which local
brewers they competed with, the court found no discrimination against AnheuserBusch's competitors. But see Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block &
Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), where the court expressly rejected the
reasoning of the seventh circuit in Anheuser-Busch, and said that "different purchasers" as stated in the Clayton Act as amended did not mean competing purchasers.
2. Clayton Act, c. 323, § 2, 38 STAT. 730 (1914) : "That it shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either di-
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discriminations in price which affected the competition of purchasers 3 as well as the competition of other sellers. 4 The courts
considered a mere differential in price as constituting a discrimination in price.
That the courts were correct in interpreting the Clayton Act
prior to amendment to mean a differential in price was a discrimination in price is supported by the legislative history of the
act. As reported from the House Committee on the Judiciary,
the Clayton Act proscribed geographic price discriminations designed to force local competitors of the seller or the favored
purchaser out of business. 5 The House Judiciary's majority report said the specific practice sought to be prohibited was that
which corporations used:
"To destroy competition . . . and render unprofitable the
business of competitors by selling ... goods, wares, and merchandise at a less price in the particular communities where
their rivals are engaged in business than at other places
throughout the country. Every concern that engages in this
evil practice must of necessity recoup its losses in the particular communities or sections where their commodities are
sold below cost or without a fair profit by raising the price
of this same class of commodities above their fair market
value in other sections or communities. Such a system or
rectly or indirectly to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities, which commodities are sold for use, consumption or resale within the
United States. . . . Where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce:
PROVIDED, That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price
between purchasers of commodities on account of differences in the grade, quality,
or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference
in the cost of selling, or transportation, or discrimination in price in the same
or different communities made in good faith to meet competition."
3. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 254
(1929). The defendant sold at a 20% discount to a competitor of the plaintiff,
and the Court stated that "a discrimination in prices exacted by the seller from
different purchasers of similar goods, is no less clear when it produces the evil
in respect of the line of commerce in which they are engaged than when it produces the evil in respect of the line of commerce in which the seller is engaged."
Implicit in the statement by the Court is that recognition that price discrimination which destroys the seller's competition is proscribed by the act.
4. In Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d
234 (2d Cir. 1929), the defendant was selling its cigarets at a loss of $175,000 a
year in Puerto Rico, but making a profit on its sales in the United States in
order to force plaintiff out of business. The court found this proscribed by the
Clayton Act. In Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923), while the
court found no violation of the Clayton Act, it did state that the purpose of the
act was to eliminate the evil of local price cutting by a large corporation which
destroyed small, regional businesses. See also S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark
Plug Co., 3 F.2d 415 (6th Cir. 1925).
5. H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
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practice is ... manifestly unfair and unjust, not only to com-

petitors who are directly injured thereby, but to the general
public."

Even the House minority views in opposition to the bill concluded that the purpose of the section was to force the national
manufacturer or jobber to lower his prices in all areas in order
to meet price competition in a particular area, or else be sub-

jected to prosecution for price discrimination.7 The Senate
altered the House bill by enlarging the proviso to withdraw dis-

crimination in price conducted in good faith to meet competition
from prohibited conduct and made several technical changes. 8
The Senate also deleted the criminal sanctions of a fine and/or
imprisonment found in the House version because they were believed to be too harsh for an act of such an experimental nature

as price control. 9
In 1936 Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act. Part of
this act amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act, enlarging its

scope to protect the competitor, as well as competition, from injury, and specifically prohibiting some business practices consid-

ered deleterious to fair competitive practices. 10 Another section

of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibited geographic price differ-

ences designed to destroy competition or eliminate a competitor
and provided criminal penalties."

The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act indicates
that no change in the interpretation of the Clayton Act regarding the meaning of "price discrimination" was intended by Con6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 3. One of the minority reports stated that: "The National Government is entering . . . upon the policy of enforcing uniformity in prices to all
persons and all sections."
8. S. Rep. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 54-55 (1914). The proposed Senate
version of Section 2 read: "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities, which commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale . . . with the purpose or intent thereby to destroy or wrongfully injure the
business of a competitor, of either such purchaser or seller, provided: That nothing
herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of commodities on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling
or transportation or discrimination in price in the same or different communities
made in good faith to meet competition and not intended to create monopoly:
And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own
customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade."
9. Id. at 43.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1936).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1936).
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gress. In the analysis of the price discrimination aspects of the
bill, the House Committee on the Judiciary said:
"Discriminations in excess of sound economic difference between the customers concerned, in the treatment accorded
them, involve generally an element of loss, whether only of
the necessary minimum of profits or of actual costs, that
must be recouped from the business of customers not granted them. When granted by a given seller to his customers in
other States, and denied to those within the State, they involve the use of interstate commerce to the burden and injury
of the latter. When granted to customers within the State
and denied to those beyond, they involve conversely a direct
resulting burden upon his interstate commerce with the latter. Both are within the proper and well-recognized power
12
of Congress to suppress.'
Since the provisos to the act contain supposed justifications for
price discriminations, it seems apparent that they alone must be
considered the "sound economic difference [s]" referred to
above."13 In referring to the amendment of Section 2(a) of the
Clayton Act by the Robinson-Patman Act, which limited the
showing of a good faith meeting of competition to rebutting a
prima facie case of price discrimination, the report stated:
"It should be noted that while the seller is permitted to meet
local competition, it does not permit him to cut local prices
until his competitor has first offered lower prices, and then
he can go no further than to meet those prices. If he goes
further, he must do so likewise with all his other customers,
or make himself liable to all of the penalties of the act, in14
cluding treble damages.'
The conference committee concluded that a difference in price
among different localities was a discrimination in price within
the meaning of Section 2 (a). Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act concerning geographical price discriminations was considered as an additional and distinct means of dealing with geographic price discrimination. In referring to the effect of Sec12. H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).

For a discussion of

"price discrimination," see AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 18-22 (2d ed. 1959) ; REPORT OF THE

GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY TtlE
155-70 (1955).
13. PATMAN, THE ROnINSON-PATMAN ACT 39-48 (1938).
14. H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
ATTORNEY
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tion 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act on the amendment to the
Clayton Act, the conference managers stated that Section 3:
". authorized nothing which that amendment prohibits,
and takes nothing from it. On the contrary, where only civil
remedies and liabilities attach to violations of the amendment ... section 3 sets up special prohibitions as to the particular offenses therein described and attaches to them also
the criminal penalties therein provided."' 15
Notwithstanding the evident legislative history that indicates
Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act was meant to be a special
sanction against geographic price discrimination, rather than to
supplant Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act,' 6 apparent uncertainty
has been created in the courts as to the proper scope of Section
2(a) of the Clayton Act. While an early case allowed the recovery of treble damages under Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act,' 7 a later case held that Section 3 was not an anti-trust act
so as to permit civil action for treble damages, thus restricting
its application to criminal enforcement.' 8 After the latter de15. H.R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936). Compare this provision, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1936), with the original proposal by the House for the
Clayton Act in 1914, which stated: "That any person engaged in commerce who
shall either directly or indirectly discriminate in price between different purchasers
of commodities in the same or different sections or communities, which commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale . . . with the purpose or intent to
thereby destroy or wrongfully injure the business of a competitor of either such
purchaser or seller shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court: PROVIDED, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers
of commodities on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the
commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for differences in the cost of
transportation."
Rep. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1914).
16. H.R. Rep.H.R.
No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1936) (Utterback, "Price
Discrimination").
17. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954). In relying
on both Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1936)) and Section
3 of the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13a (1936)) the Court said: "The
destruction of a competitor was plainly established, as required by the amended
§ 2(a) of the Clayton Act; and the evidence to support a finding of purpose to
eliminate a competitor, as required by § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, was
ample." Treble damages were allowed. See also Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242
F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1957) and Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956)
(private actions brought under 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1936), the section of the Robinson-Patman Act imposing criminal penalties).
18. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 377 (1958). The Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal of a treble damage action brought under Section
3, stating as to Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act: "[T]his section, in contrast to § 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act, does not on its face amend the Clayton
Act. Further, § 3 contains only penal sanctions for violation of its provisions;
in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary, these
sanctions should under familiar principles be considered exclusive, rather than
supplemented by civil sanctions of a distinct statute." Actually, the case resolved
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cision, it was clear that any civil action relating to geographic
price discriminations must be brought, if at all, under Section 2
9
of the Clayton Act as amended. In FTC v. Cement Institute"
the Supreme Court apparently upheld a civil action under Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act for geographical price discrimina-

tion. However, the lower federal courts have not been uniform
in their decisions. Some have held geographical price differences
are discriminations within the act 20 and some have held that
they are not.21 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court in
the instant case to resolve this conflict. The court of appeals,
in determining that the lowering of price in the St. Louis area
by Anheuser-Busch was not prohibited conduct under the Clayitself on the determination that the Robinson-Patman Act was not an "antitrust" act under the sections granting civil enforcement and treble damage actions
to those persons injured by violations of the anti-trust acts.
19. 333 U.S. 683 (1948). See Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S.
726 (1945), where the contention that the prohibition of Section 2(a) of the
Clayton Act was directed only to competing buyers in the same place was specifically rejected. See also FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). In
connection with the basing point system as price discrimination, see SIMON, GEoGRAPHIC

PRICING PRACTICES

(BASING-POINT

SELLING)

(1950)

for

a compre-

hensive treatment of that aspect of price discrimination.
20. In Atlas Bldg. Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950
(10th Cir. 1959), the court refused the defendant's contention that to be actionable under 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1936) discriminations must be between purchasers
in competition with one another, saying that the purpose of the section was to
prevent a seller from charging various purchasers different prices for the same
type of products when the resultant effect was to lessen competition. For apparently erroneous dictum, see Baim & Blank Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541,
543 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), wherein the court stated: "Plaintiff does not dispute that
one cannot have a cause of action for violation under section 2(a) of the Clayton
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. sec. 13, unless one is
an actual purchaser from the person charged with the discrimination." In Samuel
H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945), the petitioner sold in interstate commerce at lower prices to some purchasers than to others. The Commission's contention, which was sustained by the court, was that having shown this,
the burden was upon the seller to justify such conduct. In E. B. Muller & Co. v.
FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944), the court here specifically found that the
petitioner had sold at lower prices in New Orleans than in other parts of the
country, and held that this was a discrimination in price, which had the proscribed effect of ruining the competitor of Muller. See also Elgin Corp. v. Atlas
Bldg. Products Co., 251 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1958).
21. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956). This was an action against an interstate dealer
for selling locally at a price below what the dealer charged in other areas. In
affirming for the defendant, the Court stated: "It is also broadly stated in the
argument that a differential in price in and of itself constitutes discrimination
within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended." Id. at 367.
"There is no presumption set up anywhere that, merely because there is a differential in various areas, necessarily a price discrimination exists." Id. at 368.
While the distinction may be fine, it seems that a discrimination does in fact
exist, but that the proscribed results of such a discrimination are missing so as
to take it out of the sphere of Section 2(a) prohibitions. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
FTC, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959). See, however, PATMAN, THE- ROBINSONPATMAN ACT 39-48 (1938), wherein apparently any difference in price is a diserimination, unless economically justified by cost savings.
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ton Act, found no relationship between the purchasers which
made a mere difference in price a discrimination in price. In
essence they concluded that unless a competitive relationship
existed among those purchasers paying different prices, the
22
price difference did not constitute a price discrimination.
The Supreme Court, by its holding in the instant case, has
definitely established that a "price discrimination" within the
meaning of the Clayton Act as amended is any price difference
established by granting reductions in one area without proportionate reductions in all other areas. That this was the intention
of the Congress appears evident, even though it results in a policy of strict price uniformity. However, such a price discrimination establishes only a prima facie violation of the act if harm
does, or is likely to, occur to competition or to a competitor. This
may be conclusively rebutted if the price discrimination meets
the standards of Section 2(b) for a good faith meeting of a
28
competitor's prices.
The decision, which limits its scope to the narrow point of
defining price discrimination, should lessen the confusion surrounding the interpretation of Section 2 (a), and provide a definite standard on which businessmen and lawyers can rely. However, such a standard appears to require a complete uniformity
of pricing unless a business successfully carries the burden of
proving that any differences are justified. The effect of the
decision may best be appreciated by considering the following
possibility: If a manufacturer sells nationally at varying prices,
he may conceivably be forced to prove that all of the price differences are caused by variations in costs, or that no harm results to competition, or that his prices are justifiable by a good
faith meeting of competition.
Whether or not one considers the Clayton and RobinsonPatman Acts desirable legislation, it is practically impossible to
22. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1959) : "Where
two purchasers from a seller are competing With each other, that competition creates a relationship that entitles them to comparable treatment as to price, without
which treatment there would be a discrimination in price within the meaning of
section 2(a). On the other hand, in a case like this, where the purchasers from a
seller are located in different areas of the country and are not in competition with
each other, there is generally no relationship which entitles them to be charged
the same prices."
23. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) (beginning at page 251 the
dissenting opinion gives a good review of the legislative history). The writer is
forced to conclude that the legislative history is in favor of the dissent. See
PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 40 (1938) ; McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. L. & Ec. 137 (1958).
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disagree with the Court as to what is the proper interpretation
of Section 2 (a) on the facts of the instant case. The act is being
interpreted to prevent a national seller from engaging in predatory price cutting to eliminate local competition. While the decision does not differentiate between selling at a loss or at less
than "fair market value," and selling at a price which returns a
slightly smaller profit than is normally received, the prior cases
and legislative history 24 indicate that a possible argument might
be made on the point that a fair profit was being returned on the
lower sales price. Apparently this aspect was not considered in
the instant case, so it remains as a tenuous loophole for a discriminating national seller.
Merwin M. Brandon, Jr.

MINERAL RIGHTS -

UNITIZATION

-

PRESCRIPTION

Defendant conveyed to plaintiff a tract of land and reserved
a mineral servitude. Plaintiff sued to have the servitude
declared extinguished, contending that there had been no development on the land for a period exceeding ten years, and consequently that the servitude had prescribed for lack of user.
Defendant contended, however, that a voluntary unitization
agreement, approved by the Commissioner of Conservation,
which unitized the entire tract in question with a producing
tract, had the effect of forced unitization resulting in interruption of liberative prescription. The evidence showed that the
unitization agreement was for purpose of secondary recovery,
and was not signed by plaintiff landowner. The district court
entered judgment for defendant and on appeal to the court of
appeal, held, reversed. The Conservation Commissioner's approval of the unitization agreement was not such an order as to
effect a forced unitization of the area. As the unitization agreement was voluntary, it was insufficient, without user of the
servitude or express acknowledgment by the landowner of the
interruption of prescription, to prevent the mineral reservation
from prescribing. Alexander v. Holt, 116 So.2d 532 (La. App.
1959).
Although a mineral servitude cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription,' it is well settled in Louisiana that mineral
24. See notes 4 and 5 supra.

1. Savage v. Packard, 218 La. 637, 50 So.2d 298 (1950).

